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Emergency responses are premised on the hope that even when events cannot be wholly 
predicted and prevented, that timely action in the present can be exercised to strip an 
emergent event of its disruptive potential.  Yet, while the speed of emergency responses plays 
a critical role in underpinning UK resilience, it has been a relatively neglected subject in 
studies of resilience advanced through the paradigm of preparedness.  This article aims to 
contribute to and extend work in the field of emergency governance by arguing that concerns 
surrounding the speed of response contribute to a distinct form of security enacted in 
contemporary emergency response strategies which I term ‘event suppression’.  Drawing on 
policy analysis, Preparedness Exercise observations and practitioner interviews, this article 
investigates how speed operates as a core problematic orienting the design of UK emergency 
responses organized through the Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) framework.  IEM 
promises to accelerate emergency response operations by utilizing advances in 
communications technologies to drive the bottom-up emergent self-organization of 
emergency responses.  Event suppression ensures security not by preventing an event from 
happening, but by quickly closing down the ‘disruptive’ time of the emergency event and 
restoring the linear historical time of standard political processes.   
 
Introduction 
 
In the time-sensitive field of emergency response, speed is critical. The sudden onset, non-
linear amplification, and rapid spread of emergent ‘complex emergencies’ demands the 
capacity for a speedy and flexible response. In the UK, emergency response and recovery 
activities are organized through the framework of Integrated Emergency Management (IEM). 
IEM is described as the “generic national framework for managing emergency response and 
recovery that is applicable irrespective of the size, nature or cause of an emergency, but remains 
flexible enough to be adapted to the needs of particular circumstances” (Cabinet Office, 2013: 
52). Communications are prioritized as a means of inciting emergent, bottom-up processes of 
self-organization amongst emergency responders to improve the overall speed and efficiency 
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of operations. By promising to “restor[e] normality as soon as possible” (Cabinet Office, 
2010c: 49) in the wake of an event, emergency responses underpin wider efforts to enhance 
UK resilience by ensuring that ‘disruptive challenges’ have a minimal impact on ‘daily life’ 
(Cabinet Office, 2005b: 9).   
Since 2001, UK Civil Contingencies—an assemblage of bodies, policies, ideas, techniques 
and technologies tasked with emergency planning and response in Britain—has been organized 
around the objective of enhancing UK resilience to a wide range of events from the potentially 
catastrophic (e.g. viral epidemics, financial collapses, and terrorism) to the relatively mundane 
(e.g. floods, industrial disputes, and individual stress). Resilience is defined in this context as 
the “[a]bility of the community, services, area or infrastructure to detect, prevent, and, if 
necessary to withstand, handle and recover from disruptive challenges” (Cabinet Office, 2013: 
229).  The form of security (Lobo-Guerrero, 2011) that resilience promises is therefore 
decidedly temporal.  Rather than being prophylactically performed as a space free from danger, 
security is understood ‘immunologically’ (Grove, 2014) as the capacity to quickly and 
efficiently ‘bounce-back’ from disruptive events.  Recent research has begun to consider the 
multiple, complex temporalities through which resilience is performed.  Studies of 
preparedness exercises (Adey and Anderson, 2011b), bombsite memorials (Heath-Kelly, 
2015); and military psychological resilience training programmes (Howell, 2015) demonstrate 
the similar way in which distinct governmental techniques operate simultaneously upon both 
anticipation and memory in order to fold a state of preparedness in the present.   By analysing 
how potential future emergencies are prepared for in the present, these studies have begun to 
explore the ways in which resilience “connects the past, the future, and the present, while 
instantiating a constant struggle of redefining and recreating security” (Dunn Cavelty et al., 
2015: 11). However, preparedness represents only one (albeit important) temporal register 
through which resilience strategies operate. 
In contrast to the sizeable literature analysing how preparedness relates to resilience, 
emergency response has been a relatively neglected area of study for resilience scholars 
(notable exceptions include Anderson, 2012, 2016; Grove, 2013).  Response has been 
described as a ‘logic’ (Anderson, 2016) or ‘diagram’ (Grove, 2013) of emergency governance.  
A logic may be thought of as a historically contingent strategy of power organizing 
assemblages.  Related to, yet distinct from, anticipatory logics such as preparedness, precaution 
and pre-emption, which operate prior to the onset of an event, the logic of response is enacted 
within the ‘interval of emergency’ (Anderson, 2016) to “protect life, contain and mitigate the 
impacts of the emergency and create the conditions for a return to normality” (Cabinet Office, 
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2013: 10). Responses are premised on the hope that even when events cannot be wholly 
predicted and prevented, that timely action in the present can be exercised to strip an emergent 
event of its disruptive potential. 
While the ‘speed of recovery’ has been identified as a principle consideration defining 
certain strands of resilience research (Holling, 1996; Pimm, 1991; Rose, 2007), little critical 
research has been conducted to examine its implications for the rationalities and practices of 
security.  Drawing on policy analysis, Preparedness Exercise observations and practitioner 
interviews this article investigates how speed operates as a core problematic orienting the 
design of UK emergency responses organized through the Integrated Emergency Management 
(IEM) framework.  IEM provides a rich empirical referent for analysing the complex temporal 
relations through which security is being ‘defined and recreated’ by technologies of resilience.  
IEM promises to enhance the speed and efficiency of multi-agency emergency responses by 
adopting new models of informationally-driven emergent self-organization for UK emergency 
responses.  This article aims to contribute to and extend work in the field of emergency 
governance by arguing that concerns surrounding the speed of response contribute to a distinct 
form of security enacted in contemporary emergency response strategies which I term ‘event 
suppression’.  By form of security, I am referring to the function of a security logic: the mode, 
and indeed meaning, of security enacted by a stabilized set of security practices.   Event 
suppression ensures security not by preventing an event from happening, but by quickly closing 
down the ‘disruptive’ time of the emergency event and restoring the linear historical time of 
standard political processes.  Distinct from, yet intimately related to, the form of security 
enacted by logics of preparedness, wherein security is linked to futurity (Anderson, 2010), 
event-suppression operationalizes the speed of response to strip the event of its problematizing 
potential, ensuring that disruptive events have a minimal impact on ‘daily life’. Representing 
both an enabler and exemplar for individual, community, and business resilience, a detailed 
study of IEM may provide important insight into how distinct ‘resiliences’ are being 
operationalized across different domains of life (Anderson, 2015). 
I begin this article by elucidating the chronopolitical problematization of security 
organizing contemporary emergency response.  Here, I argue that the particular danger 
attributed to contemporary threats arises from their capacity to rapidly self-amplify through 
unpredictable processes of complex emergence. The second section of this article turns to 
empirically investigate how emergency responses, guided by the framework of IEM, are being 
strategized in response to this challenge.  IEM operates to supress an event by inciting flexible 
and adaptive multi-agency emergency responses capable of rapidly self-organizing and 
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evolving quicker than threat itself. The third section will look to explicate event suppression as 
a distinct form of security and explore its implications for the politics of security.  This article 
concludes with a short reflection on the implications of this analysis for critical resilience 
scholarship. 
 
The Speed of Emergent Emergencies 
 
Critical scholarship on emergency governance since the advent of the war on terror has 
largely been driven by Giorgio Agamben’s claim that a permanent state of emergency (aka. 
exception, siege, necessity) “has become one of the essential practices of contemporary states, 
including so-called democratic ones” (2005: 2).  Analyses of Guantanamo Bay (Neal, 2006), 
the Mexican-American border (Doty, 2007) and refugee camps (Martin, 2015) have all sought 
to demonstrate the proliferation of such zones of exceptionality—extra-legal areas not subject 
to the normal legal order—within the contemporary security environment.  The suggestion is 
that the abundance of such sites demonstrate the advent of a permanent state of emergency 
wherein the exception has become the norm. 
Agamben’s own work has sought to trace the development of ‘an apparatus of state of 
emergency’ from its inception in the French Revolution to ‘the dominant paradigm of 
government in contemporary politics’ (2005: 2). Like Schmitt (2005), who he draws on 
extensively, Agamben is concerned with the sovereign ability to suspend the legal order 
through the declaration of a state of emergency.  For Schmitt, the sovereign decision to declare 
a state of emergency reveals the primacy of sovereign power over and above the constitution 
from which sovereign powers are said to derive (Schmitt, 2005).  By contrast, Agamben asserts 
that the state of exception is not a “state of law” but “law’s other”: “a space devoid of law, a 
zone of anomie in which all legal determinations…are deactivated” (2005, p. 50).  Here, 
Western traditions of sovereignty are traced to a fundamental biopolitical distinction between 
the politically qualified life (bios) and ‘bare life’ (zoé).  Operating through a topology of 
‘inclusive-exclusion’ sovereign power is rooted in the production of ‘bare life’: individuals 
stripped of all legal recognition, placing them in a legally sanctioned state of legal abandonment 
and exclusion (Agamben, 1998).  The Nazi death camp is singled out by Agamben as the “the 
fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West” (1998: 102) wherein bare life could be killed 
without it constituting murder. By transforming Schmitt’s temporal distinction between normal 
and exceptional politics into a spatial topology of inclusive-exclusion, Agamben is able to 
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identify the persistence of exceptional sites of emergency governance signifying the advent of 
a permanent ‘state of emergency’. 
A second distinct but related line of research is now emerging which seeks to 
empirically investigate the rationalities and practices governing ‘the emergency of emergence’ 
(Dillon, 2007).  In contrast to the legal-theoretical considerations of Agamben and Schmitt, 
this research approaches the relation between life and emergency from a different perspective: 
starting from the understanding of life as emergent. The emergency of emergence is “an 
emergency not derived from a base distinction underlying law but from the infinite empiricities 
of finite life understood as a continuous process of complex adaptive emergence” (Dillon and 
Lobo-Guerrero, 2009: 10). Protevi (2006) argues that synchronic accounts of emergence—the 
whole displaying properties that cannot be accounted for by the sum of its parts—have 
dominated discussions of emergence thus far.  Life, according to this understanding “is not to 
be located in its parts, but in the collective emergent properties of the whole they create” 
(Kauffman, 1995: 24).  Order, is neither imposed nor anarchic, but self-organized from the 
bottom up. The attention given to synchronic accounts of emergence tend however to 
underemphasize the temporality of this process.  Diachronic emergence refers to the sudden, 
sometimes catastrophic, and unpredictable mutations in organizational form which characterize 
the temporality of biological evolution (Dubos, 1959).  Like Deleuze’s notion of the event 
(1990), synchronic emergence describes the differenciating bursts which re-pattern the virtual, 
creating new thresholds of structure and behaviour within self-organizing systems (Protevi, 
2006: 23).  It is for this reason that emergent life “is understood to operate in that permanent 
state of immanent emergency that defines the infinite flux of its contingent emergence” (Dillon, 
2007: 19).   
The emergency of emergence is manifest in the turbulence (Cooper, 2010) or radical 
contingency (Dillon, 2007) said to characterise the contemporary security environment. This 
is most acutely observed in the high-impact, low probability threats including terrorist strikes, 
epidemics, financial crises, and natural disasters which evade actuarial capture (Daase and 
Kessler, 2007; Kessler and Daase, 2008; Massumi, 2009), strain risk-based technologies of 
security (Bougen, 2004), and haunt contemporary liberal security imaginaries that are routinely 
attributed to an increasingly complex and interdependent world (Cabinet Office, 2008a, 
2010a).  Events here are said to arise unexpectedly (Aradau, 2014) and amplify across the many 
circulations and interdependencies comprising life (Anderson and Adey, 2011; Braun, 2007; 
Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2009).  Note here that the ontology of the event is not the sudden 
materialization of a quasi-miraculous Schmittian exception (Schmitt, 2005), but something that 
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unfolds over time: rapidly snowballing from conditions too numerous and distributed to be 
fully accounted for in advance. The emergency emerges: an idea already contained within the 
etymology of emergency itself which connotes “the rising of a submerged body out of the 
water’ and ‘the process of coming forth, issuing from concealment, obscurity, or confinement” 
(Neocleous, 2008: 72). Yet, in studying the emergency of emergence have we not 
underemphasized the significance of the temporal emergence of the emergency? Whether it be 
the rapid spread of Ebola; the radicalization of terrorists; or the toxification of assets within a 
financial crisis—danger is cast as something which emerges rapidly and unexpectedly through 
complex and often unpredictable processes. Can we not conclude that what is so radically 
threatening about the contemporary emergency event is its capacity to rapidly become 
dangerous through processes of complex emergence?  
The problematic of threat’s rapid emergence is covered explicitly in the 2008 Pitt 
Review. The report was commissioned to undertake a comprehensive review of the 2007 UK 
summer floods which resulted in the “largest loss of essential services since World War II, with 
almost half a million people without mains water or electricity” (Cabinet Office, 2008b: ix). 
The rapid onset of the flooding came ‘before anyone could really react’ (Cabinet Office, 2008b: 
ix), overwhelming the drainage infrastructures across England and Wales. Failures quickly 
cascaded across interdependent ‘systems of systems’ - assemblages which include 
infrastructure and supply chains that are “intimately linked with the economic and social 
wellbeing and security of the communities they serve” (Cabinet Office, 2008b: 251). This 
produced a ‘domino effect’, interrupting essential services including power supplies, transport 
links, telecommunications, and mains water supply (Cabinet Office, 2008b: 3). These 
distributed failures fed back upon once another, in places like Longlevens, Gloucestershire 
where flooding disrupted the power supply of pumping stations depended on for flood response 
(Cabinet Office, 2008b: 250). Throughout the report, the particular danger of large-scale 
flooding is associated with its ‘rapid onset’ (Cabinet Office, 2008b: ix, 45, 334) and ability to 
quickly spread through ‘cascading effects’ (Cabinet Office, 2008b: 238, 250-251). Moreover, 
it is with respect to its rapid emergence that large-scale flooding may be likened to more sinister 
dangers threatening British communities: 
  
Because of the scale and speed of the risk they pose, those phenomena have similar 
potential to other security challenges to threaten our normal way of life across 
significant areas of the country with little warning (Cabinet Office, 2008a: 15). 
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Similarly, the challenge posed by the rapid and unpredictable emergence of contemporary 
threats is not confined to emergency response alone.  The rising prominence of ‘rapid response’ 
units within military (Der Derian, 2001), policing (Fassin, 2013) and disaster response (King, 
2002) operations reflect a growing concern with our capacity to react quickly and decisively in 
the face of emergent threats.  
Resilience has been advanced as a solution to the problem of the rapid and 
unpredictable emergence of contemporary emergencies (Chandler, 2014; Walker and Cooper, 
2011).  Resilience refers to the capacity of a broad array of complex adaptive systems to absorb, 
withstand and ‘bounce-back’ quickly and efficiently from a perturbation by exercising their 
own inherent capacities of emergent self-organization (Zebrowski, 2016).  In other words, 
resilience promises to secure life lived under a “perpetual state of potential emergence(y)” 
(Massumi, 2007: no pagination) by activating “a system’s emergent response to emergencies” 
(Kaufmann, 2013: 55).  Resilience governance involves enhancing the adaptive capacity of 
those systems underpinning or constitutive of valued forms of life to rapidly respond to 
emergent threats (and opportunities).  
One prominent technique of resilience governance is the Preparedness Exercise.  
Preparedness Exercises aim to enhance resilience by simulating a fictional emergency event in 
relation to which emergency response plans, protocols and responsibilities can be exercised 
across the multiple agencies converging to resolve an emergency event (Adey and Anderson, 
2012; Anderson and Adey, 2011; Aradau and van Munster, 2012).  Researchers have 
considered how preparedness exercises inculcate resilience through a temporal modality of the 
‘future anterior’ (Aradau, 2010: 4) which permits an unknowable future event to become 
“actionable and thus governable” (Adey and Anderson, 2012:100).  As with its historical 
antecedents, including vulnerability mapping and table-top scenario planning, preparedness 
exercises operate on an affective level to generate fears that “we are not prepared’ in order to 
produce a “continuous state of readiness” (Lakoff, 2007).  The governance of affect is even 
more explicit within preparedness exercises which, by design, aim to simulate the affective 
atmospheres of an actual emergency to habituate and enhance decision-making under 
conditions of uncertainty, stress and confusion (Adey and Anderson, 2011a, 2012; Kaufmann, 
2015).  While many studies have focused on how techniques of preparedness operationalize 
fear in order to “make individuals governable through preparedness techniques that promise to 
allay this insecurity" (2013: 575), we might conversely consider that the form of security 
enacted within preparedness exercises is related to an altogether different affect: a sense of 
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confidence in the ability of oneself and one’s colleagues to effectively respond to a future 
emergency. 
While this research has been vitally important in understanding the complex 
temporalities through which resilience is inculcated, the focus on preparedness exercises in 
understanding resilience governance risks conflating resilience with preparedness.  Moreover, 
the focus within this research on anticipation and futurity perhaps understates a core priority 
of preparedness planning in improving readiness, reducing ‘delays’ (Anderson, 2016) and 
increasing the speed and efficiency of response operations.  Emergency response provides an 
alternative way to understand the relations between time and security enacted within discourses 
of resilience.  With emergency response, resilience is associated with the rapid restoration of 
‘normality’ in the wake of an emergency.  If preparedness activities are driven by the concern 
that “we are not prepared”, then responses are compelled by concerns surrounding ‘our’ 
capacity to keep up with the rapid emergence of contemporary threats.  Such concerns are a 
manifestation of what I term the chronopolitical problematisation of security governing 
emergency response.  The term ‘chronopolitics’ was coined by French theorist Paul Virilio to 
distinguish a new problematization of power, distinct from the spatial problematization 
defining geopolitics (see also Virilio, 1977, 2005a, 2005b). According to Virilio, this 
problematic has come to the fore as technological advances have enabled the accelerated 
movement of people, goods, information and capital flows with profound effect on the spatial 
and temporal structures organizing contemporary security politics. In his characteristically 
hyperbolic account, Virilio argued that such accelerations were contributing to the ascendancy 
of temporal concerns over and above those of spatiality which have traditional held precedent 
in global politics. While we should remain suspicious of any teleological account of danger’s 
acceleration,0F1  his account of chronopolitics usefully alerts us to the political stakes arising 
from problematizations of security rooted in concerns over speed and temporality.   
In the following section, we examine how the chronopolitical problematization of 
security identified here is manifest within the resilience discourses of UK Civil Contingencies.  
A detailed empirical analysis of the emergency management framework of IEM will examine 
how the chronopolitical problematization of security has given rise to new strategies of 
emergency management rooted in the ideal of bottom-up, emergent self-organization. By 
pitting the speed of emergent emergency responses against the rapid emergence of the 
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emergency, IEM is demonstrated to coalesce around a chronopolitical problematization of 
security defined in terms of differential speeds of emergence. 
 
The Speed of Emergent Response 
 
In the event of an emergency, UK Central government promises “to react with speed and 
decisiveness” (Cabinet Office, 2005a: 5). Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) is crucial 
to this ambition.  IEM represents the principle strategic framework through which emergencies 
are managed in the UK. Described as “the concept on which civil protection in the UK is based” 
(Cabinet Office, 2013: 8), IEM sets out the conditions guiding multi-agency preparedness, 
response and recovery activities. IEM contributes to UK resilience by promising a speedy 
return to ‘normality’ in the wake of a disruptive challenge (Cabinet Office, 2008b: 397-402).  
Circumscribed within a chronopolitical problematisation of security, IEM promises to 
accelerate emergency response operations by utilizing advances in communications 
technologies to drive the bottom-up emergent self-organization of emergency responses.  IEM 
thus provides a rich empirical referent for understanding how resilience discourses extend, 
inflect, adapt and transfigure extant logics and practices of emergency response. 
We could begin by noting that while the speed of a response has long been a consideration 
for emergency planners, it too has a history.  Collier and Lakoff (2015) trace a genealogy of 
contemporary preparedness planning to the emergence of ‘vital systems thinking’ in America 
in the 1930s.  This began as a static evaluation which applied the insights of systems theory to 
assess the vulnerability of vital systems upon which modern life was understood to increasingly 
dependent.  Speed only arose as a prominent concern in the context of the Cold War as 
American preparedness planning was subsumed under a policy of deterrence.  Deterrence 
depended on the promise of a retaliatory nuclear strike.  Recognizing that the “US would not 
have the luxury of a long period during which to mobilize its industrial-military power as in 
the prior two wars” (Collier and Lakoff, 2015: 28) an ‘ideology of preparedness’ (Sherry, 1977) 
arose to "maintain a state of ongoing readiness to withstand and respond to a sudden nuclear 
attack" (Collier and Lakoff, 2015: 29).  Similar concerns played out in the UK, where estimated 
timescales pertaining to nuclear escalation had to be continually revised downwards within the 
‘Government War Book’ over the course of the Cold War.1F2  Hennessey (2010: 200-205) 
                                                 
2 The Government War Book detailed how a ‘continuity of government’ apparatus was to be progressively 
unfolded through three sequential stages (pre-Precautionary Stage matters, the Precautionary Stage, and War) in 
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recounts how the rapid escalation of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis caused great distress 
amongst emergency planners whose plans depended on a period of nuclear escalation 
extending over a number of months (Hennessy, 2010: 200-205)!  While we should be careful 
to account for the different histories of American and British emergency planning, we can 
clearly discern how concerns with speed originally manifest in terms of readiness: guaranteeing 
the second-strike response capacity underwriting a policy of deterrence (Aradau and Munster, 
2011: 27) (which was itself playing out as a nuclear arms race).  Taken together, the mutual 
imbrication of these logics of preparedness and response performed an early from of resilience 
in which the capacity to withstand and bounce-back from an attack provided insurance against 
the failure of deterrence policies to pre-empt nuclear catastrophe. 
Rather than representing a radical rupture in the logics and practices of emergency 
governance, IEM may be better understood as extending and transfiguring extant logics of 
emergency response. The concept of IEM first appeared in Home Office Circulars (ES3/1993) 
entitled Integrated Emergency Management: Application to Local Authority Emergency 
Preparedness.  By this time, the end of the Cold War was already shifting the focus of planning 
from wartime to peacetime emergencies, however this had not yet been reflected in emergency 
legislation, which continued to prioritise civil defence concerns. The concept of Integrated 
Emergency Management first emerged as a means of enhancing all-hazards capabilities and 
arrangements in a time of rapidly diminishing civil defence funding. As opposed to the 
definition of integration used today, which emphasizes the coordination of informationally-
enabled multi-agency responses (Cabinet Office, 2013: 15), integration here merely referred to 
“[t]he integration of arrangements for a range of emergencies, whether in peace or as the result 
of a hostile act” (as quoted in Rockett, 1994: 50). In his critique of civil contingencies 
arrangements at that time, Rockett noted that 'informational and structural integration is 
entirely absent from British counter-disaster planning’ with responder agencies working “in 
the British tradition, quite independently of one another” (1994: 53). The impetus for a 
comprehensive review of UK Civil Contingencies/Civil Defence architecture was only 
afforded at the turn of the twenty-first century in the wake of a series of high profile domestic 
crises including fuel protests, flooding incidents and an outbreak of foot and mouth disease 
(Coaffee et al., 2009; Smith, 2003). In 2001, the Blair government ordered an Emergency 
Planning Review to reorganize an outdated Cold War machinery away from the catastrophic 
                                                 
line with rising international tensions in the lead-up to nuclear exchange.   See in particular CAB/175/2 on 
Exercise Felstead. 
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threats which had preoccupied planners throughout the second half of the twentieth century, 
towards the ‘complex emergencies’ and ‘new security challenges’ which were anticipated to 
define the twenty-first. In particular, the review sought to update emergency legislation and 
improve integration amongst the multiple agencies converging on a complex emergency 
(Rockett, 1994: 53; Smith, 2003: 414). 
Reflecting the close correspondence between civil defence and civil contingencies 
historically, it is widely acknowledged that the reorganization of UK Civil Contingencies 
borrowed heavily from the concepts, strategies, and organizational models of the Revolution 
in Military Affairs (RMA) (Coaffee et al., 2009; Dillon and Reid, 2009; Walker and Broderick, 
2006). In this respect, it was no coincidence that the Emergency Planning Review of UK Civil 
Contingencies architecture coincided with the Strategic Defence Review (Ministry of Defence, 
2002: 14-18) which signalled the intention of the British Armed Forces to further develop 
‘network-enabled capabilities’2F3 in a move to improve integration with U.S. and NATO forces.  
In contrast to the top-down, hierarchical forms of command and control traditionally associated 
with the military, network-centric operations are premised on the exploitation of 
communications technologies to drive the emergent bottom-up self-organization of military 
units (Cebrowski and Gartska, 1998; Dillon and Reid, 2009). By applying the insights of the 
complexity sciences to the flexible and adaptive networked organizational models adopted by 
international businesses since the 1970s,3F4 the RMA sought to develop the concepts of 
informationally-driven self-synchronization and emergent self-organization to enhance 
decision-making and overcome uncertainty within highly complex and dynamic battle 
environments. The competitive advantage afforded to network-centric operations is enhanced 
‘rapidity of effect’ (Ministry of Defence, 2002: 18).  Informational superiority in an evolving 
battle ecosystem is said to translate into decisional superiority in rapidly evolving 
environments, permitting networked troops to respond to emerging risks and capitalize on 
emerging opportunities more quickly than the enemy (Cebrowski and Gartska, 1998).  
As in military literatures of the RMA, the central problematic organizing contemporary 
emergency response operations is the radical uncertainty associated with responding to an 
emergent emergency (Comfort, 1993; Comfort et al., 2001). In the dynamic and rapidly 
evolving environment of an emergency the “information available will often be incomplete, 
                                                 
3 Within the 2002 Strategic Defence Review these are referred to as ‘network-centric capabilities’. ‘Network- 
enabled capabilities’ has become the predominant phrase now used by the Ministry of Defence 
4 For an example of more contemporary engagements with complexity and emergence amongst management 
scholars see the journal 'Emergence: Complexity & Organization’. 
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inaccurate or ambiguous, and perceptions of the situation may differ within and between 
organisations”(Cabinet Office, 2013: 18) hampering decision-making on the ground (Adey and 
Anderson, 2011b). This problematization of emergency response has generated a sizeable 
industry in information systems and technologies, composed largely of military spin-offs4F5 and 
supported by academic research on emergency response information systems (e.g. Comfort, 
1993; Yang et al., 2013). In the UK, Resilience Direct has been developed as a secure digital 
collaboration platform facilitating communication and knowledge sharing amongst emergency 
responders during the preparation, response and recovery phases of an emergency. It is 
underpinned by a series of communications infrastructures including HITS (the High Integrity 
Telecommunications System), Airwave and MTPAS (Mobile Telecoms Privileged Access 
Scheme) which have been act as layered fall-back solutions ensuring the resilience of 
communications—recognized as a “fundamental enabler underpinning the effective response 
to any emergency” (Cabinet Office, 2013: 110)—in the event of network overload or physical 
disruption. Information technologies are championed as a means of ‘overcoming some 
limitations in human information processing that have long stymied organizational action in 
complex environments (Comfort, 1993: 18). Enriching the information available to emergency 
responders is seen to enhance both individual and collective decision-making and permit the 
devolution of decision-making (Comfort, 1993). Problem-solving, rather than being confined 
to the individual, can be distributed through a network of agencies comprising diverse 
specialisms, skills and expertise. This, in turn, accelerates emergency responses: permitted 
emergent challenges to be responded to quickly and decisively while allowing different 
response activities to be pursued concurrently, rather than sequentially, across a response 
network (Emergency Planning College, 2008). Taken together, the concern with timeliness of 
decision-making, the avoidance of delays and the concurrence of disparate response and 
recovery activities collectively speak to the need to accelerate emergency responses in the face 
of the potentially rapid emergence of an emergency. 
With IEM, information circulation is elevated to the central organizing principle driving 
the emergent, bottom-up self-organization of emergency responses. The stated aim of IEM “is 
to develop flexible and adaptable arrangements that will enable an effective joint response to, 
and recovery from, any emergency” (Cabinet Office, 2013: 8). Guided by the eight principles 
of anticipation, preparedness, subsidiarity, direction, information, integration, co-operation and 
continuity, IEM underpins UK resilience by ‘restoring normality as soon as possible’ following 
                                                 
5 Field notes: Civil Contingencies show; Coventry UK (24 September 2014). 
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an emergency (Cabinet Office, 2003: 6, 17, 2008b: 350-398, 2010c: 49).  Horizon-scanning 
and regular risk assessments are conducted to identify potential events in their germinal stage 
where they can be pre-empted before their capacity to inflict significant damage has been 
realized. Anticipation and preparedness may, however, in certain instances prove insufficient. 
The declaration of an emergency by the emergency services will shift operations from 
preparation phase to response phase in accordance with procedures set out in emergency plans 
required by the Civil Contingencies Act (HM Government, 2009: 61).  
Effective emergency responses are dependent upon the timely identification of the 
challenges posed by an emerging event. In addition to their immediate life-saving duties, first 
responders are required to continually assess both the nature and potential development of an 
incident. Observations are collected and communicated through Situational Reports (SitReps) 
which are uploaded to Resilience Direct and processed at the coordinating level to generate a 
Common Recognized Information Picture (CRIP) (Cabinet Office, 2013: 68). This 
information, which is further enriched through integrated mapping technologies allows 
responders to access common information in real-time: promoting shared situational awareness 
across the diverse responder agencies converging on a response, boosting integration and 
accelerating the completion of complex tasks by enabling agencies to self-synchronize their 
activities (Cabinet Office, 2013: 9). 
In the majority of cases, a response will be managed from the ‘bronze’ (operational) level 
alone. A response at this level will be led by the police and concerned exclusively with 
addressing the immediate needs of a response. In situations where the potential reach or 
devastation of an event require greater planning (HM Government, 2009: 64-65) additional 
levels of organization may be introduced to assist in the coordination of activities on the 
ground. ‘Silver’ (Tactical Co-ordinating Group (TCG)) or ‘gold’ (Strategic Co-ordinating 
Group (SCG)) levels of command may be activated to assist multi-agency activities in the 
planning, co-ordination, and distribution of resources in a localized event. Events escalating in 
severity and/or geographic scope may have this local command and control structure 
supplemented with additional tiers of management at the regional (devolved administrations 
outside England) or national level (Cabinet Office, 2013). Guided by the principle of 
subsidiarity, decisions are devolved to the lowest appropriate level with higher echelons of 
organization introduced only to facilitate operations on the ground by providing strategic 
direction and assisting with coordination (HM Government, 2009: 64-65). Subsidiarity, 
preserves continuity by recognizing that “emergency response and recovery should be 
grounded in the existing functions of organisations and familiar ways of working, albeit on a 
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larger scale, to a faster tempo and in more testing circumstances” (Cabinet Office, 2013: 15). 
Architectures of emergency response are thereby constructed in an emergent, bottom-up 
fashion and enabled to quickly swell and deflate in light of the specific demands posed by a 
unique emergency event. 
In contrast to the unilinear escalation of an emergency event presumed in the War Book 
response strategies organized through the IEM framework aim to incite flexible and adaptive 
responses capable of rapid, non-linear and thus highly contingent evolutionary trajectories. 
Coordinating groups at the strategic and tactical levels also may use the CRIP to establish the 
logistical requirements of a particular event. To do so, the emergency is fragmented into its 
component challenges (Anderson and Adey, 2011: 7-8). These isolated problems may then be 
addressed by adopting, adapting, and actioning pre-drafted emergency plans. The assemblage 
of distinct combinations of emergency plans over the course of a continually evolving event 
will activate different networks of response. Bespoke governmental networks, comprising 
particular category 2 responders,5F6 coordinating body subgroups, and advisory bodies may be 
introduced into a response network in order to address the specific challenges generated by an 
emergent emergency event. The product is a flexible and adaptive assemblage of response 
(Grove, 2014) capable of rapidly responding to the emergent challenges issued from an 
unfolding emergency. As in the doctrines of the RMA from which these logics derive, the 
adoption of network-centric organizational models aims to yield returns on the speed of 
operations. Optimizing the conditions of emergence of a flexible and adaptive assemblage of 
response (Grove, 2014) enhances the speed of deployment and reaction to emergent challenges 
issued by an emerging emergency.  This, in turn, bolsters UK resilience by ensuring a sense of 
‘normality’ is restored as soon as possible after the onset of an emergency event. 
While security scholars have demonstrated the impact of ‘resilience-thinking’ in 
reconfiguring logics of preparedness away from the catastrophic threats of the Cold War to the 
complex emergencies of today, one could argue that the uptake of resilience discourses in the 
field of emergency response have had an even more profound effect.  Here, the adoption of 
resilience discourses has coincided with a wholesale inversion from the top-down governance 
and linear escalation of UK Civil Defence, to the bottom-up, emergent and ultimately 
contingent unfolding of contemporary emergency responses organized through the framework 
of IEM.  Responding to a chronopolitical (re)problematisation of security, defined in terms of 
                                                 
7 This is an argument that resonate with a number of recent studies critiquing the ways in the threat of terror, and 
especially ‘ticking-time bomb’ scenarios, serve to legitimate emergency measures and increased executive 
powers in the context of the ‘war on terror’  (Glezos, 2011; Stahl, 2008). 
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differential speeds of emergence, IEM has been advanced as a framework for enhancing the 
speed and efficiency of emergent emergency response operations.  In the following section, we 
turn to consider the (chrono)political implications of contemporary logics of emergency 
response for contemporary security governance.  
Speed and Event Suppression 
 
The central problematic organizing contemporary emergency response operations is an 
abiding concern with differential speeds of emergence. In the previous sections, we have 
outlined how this chronopolitical problematic has transformed the logics and practices of 
emergency response. In this section, we turn to analyse the form of security enacted within 
contemporary logics of response.  Just as logic of responses were shown to extend, inflect, 
adapt and transfigure extant logics of emergency governance, so too should event suppression 
be understood to derive from the forms of security enacted by affiliated logics of emergency 
governance.  Our analysis therefore focuses on relating and distinguishing event suppression 
from the forms of security enacted within affiliated logics of emergency governance. 
Explicating the form of security enacted within logics of response will enable to us to begin to 
explore the implications of event suppression for the politics of security.   
Resilience strategies are circumscribed within a biopolitical imperative to ‘make life live’ 
(Foucault, 1998, 2003). By enhancing the regenerative capacities of systems underpinning and 
constitutive of community life, resilience strategies aim to optimize the conditions under which 
life might quickly and efficiently bounce-back from a systemic perturbation. However, 
resilience strategies operate in relation to a different problematization of ‘the event’ than 
traditional biopolitical imaginaries. Traditionally, ‘standardizing’ techniques of biopolitical 
governance were associated with a particular rendering of the event as risks (Dean, 2010: 206; 
Ewald, 1991). Risks are most commonly represented as punctuated occurrences of an event 
within time. These events may be categorized in accordance with their essential type and 
evaluated with regards to their probability. Biopolitical techniques, such as insurance, act on 
this actuarial data to spread the (primarily financial) costs borne by an event’s actualization 
across a population (Ewald, 1991).  
Resilience strategies respond to a new problematisation of emergency events beyond risk, 
focused on the capacity of an event to rapidly escalate through unpredictable processes of 
complex emergence.  This new rendering of the event, as we alluded to previously, has a 
history.  For Collier and Lakoff the advent of vital systems security in the 1930s represented 
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“a significant mutation in biopolitical modernity” (2015: 21) rooted in a shift in governmental 
attention to the high devestation/low probability ‘reflexive risks’ (Beck, 1992) operating at “the 
limits of a rationality of insurance’ (Lakoff, 2007: 247). As a “mode of knowledge which 
challenges or replaces statistical calculability” (Aradau and Munster, 2011: 45), logics of 
preparedness aim to render a future event knowable, and thus governable, through ‘enactment’ 
(Collier, 2008) techniques such as Preparedness Exercises.  Emergency response may likewise 
be understood as a post-risk logic of security, however the ways in which the event is ‘made 
actionable’ is very different.  Rather than invoking a temporal modality of the ‘future anterior’ 
(Aradau, 2010: 4) to render an event knowable and thus governable, emergence responses 
begin by disaggregating the event its component challenges (Anderson and Adey, 2011: 7-8) 
which can be collectively addressed through the assemblage of  distinct combinations of 
emergency plans. 
The unique, unrepeatable nature of any emergency event’s emergence within and across 
interdependent systems strains efforts to sufficiently typologize them according to their 
essential type as ‘risks’ (Foucault, 2003: 246). Instead of operating in respect of the general 
type of an event, as with insurance, emergency response operations aim to subdue the generic 
processes of emergence animating any event (Massumi, 2009).  Operationalising a diagram of 
governance rooted in technologically-enabled models of bottom-up self-organization, IEM 
aims to deliver emergent emergency responses uniquely tailored to address the specific 
demands issued by a singular event.  By accelerating the diverse activities performed within 
an emergency response to quickly and efficiently address the component challenges of an 
emerging event, IEM serves to supress an emergency event by suffocating the generic 
processes animating the emergence of an unfolding event. It is in this regard that we can 
appreciate how resilience strategies enact a related, albeit inverted, logic to that of preemption. 
Whereas pre-emptive power is exercised to dampen the conditions of emergence and terminate 
potential threats before they become dangerous (Cooper, 2006; de Goede, 2008, 2009; 
Massumi, 2007), resilience looks to optimize the conditions of emergence, or evolve-ability, 
of valued systems to rapidly adapt to, and evolve through, crises.  In doing so, the response 
strategies of UK Civil Contingencies foreground a dimension of the event’s temporality 
marginalized within the risk-based imaginaries underpinning traditional biopolitical strategies 
of security. Resilience strategies operate within, and upon, the duration of an emergent event. 
It is not how often events appear within time (with what probability) but the temporality of the 
event’s emergence which provides resilience strategies with both their operational environment 
and strategic target. 
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Event suppression is clearly affiliated with the reparational form of security (Lobo-
Guerrero, 2011) performed by risk-based technologies of security like insurance which aim to 
secure a particular way of life by promising financial compensation in response to a pre-
specified event.  Event suppression likewise ensures security not by preventing an event from 
happening, but by stripping the event of its disruptive potential. However, rather than operating 
through compensatory mechanisms, IEM aims to ensure security by accelerating response 
activities so as to minimize the temporal duration, spatial extension, and destructive potential 
of an unfolding event.  Events happen (indeed it is widely acknowledged that they cannot be 
wholly prevented), but they are quickly responded to in order to ensure minimal impact on the 
processes comprising the life of the community. Of course, risk-based rationalities and 
technologies of security governance, continue to play a pivotal role in underwriting UK 
resilience. Risk-registers are ubiquitous as a means of directing preparedness activities and 
allocating budgets (Cabinet Office, 2015; Hagmann and Dunn Cavelty, 2012), while insurance 
is critical in facilitating the recovery of individuals, families and businesses to an emergency 
(Cabinet Office, 2008b: 143–164). Far from being eclipsed, risk-based forms of security, like 
logics of preparedness, are shifted, repurposed, and sometimes even subordinated within 
evolving assemblages of emergency governance. 
With event suppression, security is realized, not by preventing events from happening but 
by quickly closing down the ‘disruptive’ time of the emergency event and restoring the linear 
historical time of standard political processes. Event suppression devenomizes an emergency, 
bleeding an event of its disruptive potential.  Event suppression thereby serves to pre-empt the 
onset of what Edkins (2002, 2003) has called ‘trauma time’. Trauma time is the disruptive time 
of a crisis. Its political significance lies in its power to interrupt, and problematizes, the linear 
chronological time underpinning sovereign power (Edkins, 2006: 102-111). Identifying that 
“[m]emory, and the form of temporality that it generally instantiates and supports, is central to 
the production and reproduction of the forms of political authority that constitute the modern 
world” (2006: 101), Edkins has investigated how the weaving of traumatic events back into 
linear narratives supportive of political power through activities including memorialization 
serves to continually re-constitute the authority of the state in the wake of potentially 
destabilizing crises (Edkins, 2002, 2003). For Edkins, sovereign power is preserved, 
constituted and contested in the wake of a traumatic event when “what we call the state moves 
quickly to close down any openings produced by putting in place as fast as possible a linear 
narrative of origins” (Edkins, 2006: 107). 
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Though they seek to achieve it in very different ways, both resilience strategies and 
memorialization practices act similarly to strip an event’s potential to disturb daily life. This 
raises questions concerning the role which resilience plays in the maintenance, constitution, 
and perhaps even challenging, of political order. Like memorialization, resilience strategies act 
to mitigate an event’s capacity to disrupt the ‘normal’ temporal order. But rather than 
retrospectively domesticating ‘trauma time’ by imposing upon it a meaning supportive of 
narratives underpinning (state) order, resilience strategies aim to quickly foreclose the duration, 
extension and intensity of an unfolding event. The speed of reaction is clearly integral to both 
these strategies, yet it is only in logics of event suppression that speed is strategically deployed 
to mitigate the duration and intensity of the time experienced as ‘traumatic’. By accelerating 
the activities of tightly integrated agencies operating concurrently on varied aspects of a 
common response strategy, responses organized through the framework of IEM act to quickly 
close down the ‘disruptive’ time of the emergency event and accelerate the return to 
‘normality’. Security is realized not by eradicating threats, but by divesting an event of its 
problematizing potential, and ensuring the continuity of the ‘linear, narrative time’ (Edkins, 
2006:108) of standard political and economic processes. 
A fuller account of the (chono)political implications of resilience in the field of emergency 
governance can be discerned by attending to the distinct, but complimentary, forms of security 
enacted by logics of preparedness and response respectively. In respect of debates surrounding 
the politics of exception, techniques of preparedness may serve to mitigate or offset recent 
concerns surrounding the impact of the chronopolitical problematisation of security in eroding 
the functions of reflection and accountability underpinning decision-making in the field of 
emergency management.  So where Virilio (1977, 2005b: 13) warned of the corrosive effects 
that concerns with acceleration have had on the processes of deliberation, negotiation and 
debate underpinning liberal democracy6F7, the temporality underpinning techniques of 
preparedness may provide an opportunity for slower, more considered processes—such as the 
drafting of legislation or the inculcation of habits and routines—to structure decision-making 
with regards to emergencies (Scarry, 2011).  
With regards to debates surrounding the governance of affect in the field of emergency 
management, these logics appear similarly off-set.  Logics of preparedness, it could be said, 
operate by creating disruptive times and amplifying security affects. Simulations, risk-
                                                 
7 This is an argument that resonate with a number of recent studies critiquing the ways in the threat of terror, and 
especially ‘ticking-time bomb’ scenarios, serve to legitimate emergency measures and increased executive 
powers in the context of the ‘war on terror’  (Glezos, 2011; Stahl, 2008). 
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registers, and emergency plans, for example, all operate by envisioning a multiplicity of 
potential futures to incite and direct actions in the present.  Affectively, the future is cast as a 
potential danger to incite activities which allay this insecurity and builds confidence in the 
ability to respond to future events. The most developed form of this is the preparedness 
exercise, which, through its design, creates an aesthetic: a heightened affective atmosphere in 
relation to which players can act out their responsibilities within simulated conditions.  Logics 
of response, by contrast, might be said to operate to eliminate disruptive times and quell 
security affects.  Event suppression operates to rapidly close down the chaotic time of the 
emergency in order to minimize its disruptive effects.  Its effect is anaesthetic: extinguishing 
the rise and spread of affects such as fear and anxiety which could potentially disrupt and 
destabilize the relatively insipid temporality of ‘everyday life’.  In spite of their differences, 
the logics, when taken together, might be understood as complementary.  Where techniques of 
preparedness are operationally dependent on the preservation of anxiety, logics of response 
operate to ensure these anxieties never bubble over into outright fear in the midst of an actual 
event. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The real crisis would be a situation where crisis was not recognized… 
(Critchley, 1999: 12) 
 
This article has sought to render explicit the form of security enacted within the emergency 
response strategies of UK Civil Contingencies. Through a study of the response framework of 
IEM, I have argued that the speed of emergence figures as a core problematic organizing the 
ways in which emergencies are understood and responded to within contemporary emergency 
response operations. The aim of IEM is to provide a flexible and adaptable structure within 
which the concurrent operations of heterogeneous agencies can be coordinated in order to 
quickly close-down crises and re-establish ‘normality’. This, I contend, has important 
implications for the way in which security is understood and pursued. Specifically, the response 
strategies of UK Civil Contingencies are shown to enact a form of security which I term event 
suppression. Event suppression contributes to UK resilience by acting to diminish the 
emergency’s temporal duration, geographic scope, and destructive potential so as to secure a 
speedy return to ‘normality’. Event suppression strips the event of its problematizing potential, 
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ensuring that disruptive events have a minimal impact on ‘daily life’. Security, rather than a 
space characterized by absence of threat, is defined with respect to the preservation, and rapid 
restoration, of the historical time of standard political and economic processes. 
In explicating the chronopolitical problematization of security and form of event 
suppression from a singular case, this article intends to advance an initial formulation of 
transformations currently taking place in the field of emergency response associated with the 
concept of resilience. Given the limited empirical focus of this article, further analysis will be 
required to understand how these concepts are differentially enacted in alternative empirical 
sites. In doing so, we should be careful to attend to the multiplicity of meanings and practices 
embedded within the concept of resilience.  What this study has demonstrated is that far from 
representing a singular ‘thing’, very different ‘resiliences’ (Anderson, 2015) can be identified 
by attending to the distinct logics and forms of security enacted under the concept of resilience.   
Likewise, the chronopolitical implications of resilience are likely to shift, and be 
rearticulated, as we move to different empirical fields.  Where concerns with speed and 
acceleration give rise to the resilience discourses operating in the field of emergency response, 
more research is required to examine the relation between time and security when resilience 
discourses are applied to crises marked by slower onsets, such as climate change (Nobert and 
Pelling, 2017), or longer durations, such as financial crises (Mckeown and Glenn, 2017).  
Similarly, there is a need to consider how resilience is being refigured in light of evolving 
understandings of time and temporality associated with the introduction of the Anthropocene 
(Grove and Chandler, 2017).  In a more explicitly political vein, we might be compelled to 
inquire into the value of slowing-down as a means of achieving resilience or reframing it in a 
way that diverges from, or runs counter to, the neoliberal governmental agendas of which it 
has become deeply complicit (Chandler, 2012; Evans and Reid, 2013; Reid, 2012).  Does the 
adoption of resilience-ideas by the transition towns (MacKinnon and Derickson, 2012) or slow 
movement (Carp, 2012) open new avenues for critically engaging with resilience beyond 
‘resistance’ (Neocleous, 2013)? Following such a line of questioning may move us beyond 
existing critiques which posit an essential character of resilience (Anderson, 2015) and enable 
us to experiment with the critical potential harboured within resilience discourses to open new 
avenues of political engagement. 
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